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The central thesis of Bethania Assy’s recent book is that we can derive an “ethics of 
responsibility” from the work of Hannah Arendt, (p. 160) and by focusing on 
responsibility we can resolve the many inner tensions, such as that between spectator and 
actor, which pervade Arendt’s work. Assy’s threefold ethics of responsibility is comprised 
of a responsibility toward ourselves to choose who we display to others through consistent 
action, a responsibility to judge for ourselves and develop representative opinions 
through engagement with others, and a responsibility to care for the plurality of the 
fragile public space that constitutes our world. (p. 10) All three levels of responsibility are 
deeply interconnected, for we show who we are through acting and judging in concert 
with our peers, and through so doing we maintain and care for the public space that 
constitutes the world. In this sense we can read Arendt’s claims that in liberal modernity 
genuinely public interests have been overwhelmed by private and social concerns, and 
that the loneliness of the jobholder, perpetually labouring, working and consuming, has 
become the dominant mode of being, as claims about our individual and collective lack of 
responsibility. The point of rights, for Arendt, is not so much to protect a sphere of private 
interest from interference by others, as it is to guarantee the space from which we can 
freely interact with our peers. Such interaction is the very thing that makes life 
meaningful, and allows us to be reconciled to a world in which great moral disasters, such 
as the Holocaust, can and do occur.
Assy is thus right to contend that responsibility is the central focus of Arendt’s ethical 
and political thinking. But we may well ask whether Arendt’s understanding of 
responsibility, as Assy interprets it, is itself ethically and politically responsible. This 
question involves answering whether the often noted inner tensions in Arendt’s work 
between the actor and the spectator, the withdrawn life of the mind and the involved life 
of the citizen, care of the self and care of the world, and so on, can be satisfactorily 
resolved. Assy admirably attempts such reconciliation. On her reading of Arendt, 
appearance, consistency, the compatibility of truth and doxa (a Socratic doctrine rejected 
by Plato), otherness and plurality operate at both the level of the mind and the level of the 
citizen. As Assy clearly illustrates, the same categories - publicity, consistency, plurality, 
responsibility, judgment - that are operative in accoutring for the life of the mind are also 
operative in the political realm. (pp. 159-60) Morality and politics are both part of the 
realm of appearance and opinion, and are not a matter of rational cognition or the 
unknown intentions of an ‘inner’ or noumenal self. Heroic figures, like Achilles, and 
master storytellers, like Homer, are not the only actors and spectators, although they have 
a unique role as the creators of cultural objects that preserve exemplarity. Through 
ordinary interactions with our peers we too can reveal who we are, even if such everyday 
actions rarely take on the veneer of exemplarity, to be remembered and used as guides for 
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future judging that the heroic likes of Achilles, as immortalised by Homer, attain. (pp. 
148-50) Similarly, though few of us attain the poetic heights of a Homer, we can also 
reveal who we are through acting as judges and spectators of the lives of ourselves and 
our peers, through deliberating with others about the sort of world we wish to live in. (p. 
149) 
Thinking clears the way for judging, judging can lead to willing, and willing can lead to 
action in the world. It is thus through being both actors and spectators in the world that 
we not only reveal who we are to others, but also constitute our own inner identity. 
Indeed we have a responsibility to do just this. Mind and world, spectator and actor, are 
ontologically interdependent and cohere at a deeper level of unity. As such, the Kantian 
dualisms in Arendt’s thought are, if we follow Assy’s reading, reconciled in a Hegelian 
sense through the intermediary of responsibility. Assy expresses this point by claiming 
that “we are of the world not merely in it”, (p. 2) or in more phenomenological terms, 
“being and appearing coincide” (2). To see a dualistic gulf between the life of the mind 
and the life of the citizen in Arendt’s work is to fail to appreciate the extent to which 
Arendt undermines that very distinction.
But this reconciliation is not without its fissures, as illustrated by the figure of Socrates. 
We get two images of Socrates in Arendt’s work, the anti-political Socrates of conscience 
who cares for the self above the world and is thereby led to inaction, and the engaged 
Socrates who neatly reconciles the political and the philosophical and is at home in both 
realms, but neither exclusively. (p. 124) We can call the first Socrates the exemplar of 
thinking and the advocate of an “ethics of impotence”, (p. 70) and the second Socrates the 
exemplar of judgment and the advocate of an ethical politics of action based on judgment 
formed through public deliberation. While Assy claims that Arendt “shifts toward” the 
latter model, (p. 124) she also notes that in what Arendt calls ‘crises’, ‘times of emer-
gences’, or (following Jaspers) ‘border situations’, we are supposedly to abandon the latter 
model and adopt the former. That is, Arendt’s “ethics of emergencies” is to revert to an 
ethics of impotence, (p. 61) by caring for the self above the world. In such times we are to 
become pure spectators who ‘act’ only by not acting at all. Assy seems to accept this 
Arendtian position which, however, undermines the generality of her responsibility 
message. A better move would have been to deploy her account of responsibility against 
Arendt, by arguing that especially in such times we must reveal who we are through 
acting, as best we can, with like-minded peers to prevent further atrocities. Sometimes, 
surely, it would be irresponsible to merely abstain from action, especially during 
emergencies. Indeed, we might say, Assy’s threefold ethics of responsibility should 
demand nothing less. 
However, there is one particular tension that Assy arguably fails to do sufficient justice. 
That is the tension between the Arendt, in her more Kantian mode, who puts in place the 
architecture for developing a constructivist account of universal judgment validity, and 
the Arendt, in her more existentialist mode, who thinks that not only can no general 
norms be rationally justified but that all such norms are positively harmful in that they 
tend to become mere customs and habits. (p. 2) While Assy admits the “deliberative 
emphasis” in Arendt’s account of judgment, she goes out of her way, on numerous 
occasions throughout her book, to differentiate this from a “rational faculty leading to 
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agreement”. (pp. 101, 136)  As such, Assy resolves the tension in Arendt’s account of 
judgment only by, arguably, overplaying the existentialist and underplaying the Kantian 
tendencies in Arendt’s work. Whether this is what Arendt would have done in her 
unwritten book on judging, or whether she would have explicitly maintained the tension, 
or moved closer to Kant, we cannot know. Which solution we think she ought to have 
adopted will clearly depend on whether or not we think that we can have, in one coherent 
account, space for universal moral norms, the importance of public interaction and 
judging, the avoidance of norms becoming mere habits and customs, and the recognition 
of the ontological status of plurality and difference as constitutive of the public realm. 
Assy’s Arendt thinks that universal moral norms are incompatible with the full 
recognition of plurality and difference, and this pushes Arendt in the direction of the likes 
of Derrida. Alternatively, something more like Seyla Benhabib’s Arendt (see p. 100) 
thinks that we can combine a respect for difference and an understanding of plurality 
with intersubjectively valid norms, and this pushes Arendt in the direction of the likes of 
neo-Kantians such as the later Rawls and Habermas. Our assessment of Assy’s book will 
thus depend on which trajectory we see Arendt’s account of judging taking. If we hold the 
latter trajectory has the answers, then the type of responsibility advocated by Assy’s 
Arendt will seem rather irresponsible in that it fails to recognise and ground the validity 
of universal moral and political norms of justice that alone can protect plurality from 
political interference. If we think the former trajectory has the answers, then the type of 
responsibility advocated by Assy’s Arendt will seem the only one that is sufficiently 
responsive to the condition of plurality that constitutes the public realm. 
We can illustrate this point as follows. For Assy the fundamental Arendtian moral and 
political question is: who do we want to share the world with? (p. 2) We must keep 
ourselves company and, as the world itself is intersubjectively constructed, the company 
we keep makes the world we live in. But, for Assy’s Arendt, there are no rationally 
justifiable standards by which we are to make the decision about the company we want to 
keep. To the person who is happy to have a murderer for company, or is happy to reveal 
themselves to be a Bluebeard or a Hitler, or if these are usual cases, an Eichmann, there is 
nothing much we can say except that you are not the sort of company we choose to keep. 
Of course, they are equally justified in responding in kind. Without intersubjectively valid 
standards to appeal to we are left in an agonistic dead end, neither side having any further 
argumentative leg to stand on. This is decisionism, for at the deepest level the basis of our 
moral and political values is the decision, which cannot be rationally justified - although 
we can try to ‘woo’ and ‘persuade’ others of our view - about the sort of company we wish 
to keep.
However, Arendt has the conceptual architecture in place to deal with this disagree-
ment. We might argue that the company we choose to keep is based on representative 
opinions, judgments that take into account the views of all, and that these opinions are, 
on these grounds, intersubjectively valid. In contrast, the opinions of a Bluebeard or a 
Hitler are not representative and therefore not intersubjectively valid. But this move 
pushes Arendt in a direction that she wished to avoid, by focusing not so much on the 
responsibility of revealing a unique who but rather on the responsibility of abiding, first 
and foremost, by intersubjectively valid norms of interaction. Of course we can make 
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room for both views – universally valid norms of right and the freedom to express who 
one is, in terms of one’s conception of the good, within the limitations of right. But then 
we get a liberal Arendt who ends up far closer to Rawls and Habermas than Assy, and 
many other Arendt scholars, would want. 
Assy’s book is a solid piece of Arendt scholarship that usefully draws upon both 
Arendt’s published work and the rich archives of her unpublished materials, as well as 
engaging with the relevant secondary literature. Assy focuses mainly on the material 
Arendt wrote in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, after her coverage of the Eichmann trial, 
which for Assy marks the beginning of Arendt’s attempts to think positively about 
morality - a problematic view given that Eichmann is a figure that steps straight out of 
1958’s The Human Condition. Assy’s use of the concept of responsibility to tie together 
disparate parts of Arendt’s work and resolve tensions is productive, even if, as I have 
suggested, it is not completely successful. At times the book, especially in the earlier 
chapters, covers material that will already be familiar to Arendt scholars. However, the 
book, especially in the latter chapters, makes more than enough interesting and original 
points in its attempt to unify Arendt’s work to warrant attention by Arendt scholars, as 
well as providing a detailed introduction for those new to Arendt’s work. More 
importantly, Assy’s book illustrates the continuing importance of Arendt’s work for 
thinking deeply about the very nature of the moral and the political. No doubt, there 
remains more thinking to do on these matters and Assy’s book helpfully raises many of 
these important issues.
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